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This work proposes a fault detection architecture for vehicle embedded sensors, allowing to deal with both system nonlinearity and
environmental disturbances and degradations. The proposed method uses analytical redundancy and a nonlinear transformation
to generate the residual value allowing the fault detection. A strategy dedicated to the optimization of the detection parameters
choice is also developed.
1. Introduction
Safety in intelligent vehicle is a key issue. In order to
insure driver safety, it is of a high importance that all the
information given by embedded sensors is more reliable.
Indeed, a large number of applications are based on data
fusion of information coming from several sensors, especially
in vehicle localization application, as depicted in [1–3].
In the aerospace domain, physical redundancy and a vot-
ing system are often used, consisting in the direct comparison
of the information provided by at least three identical sensors
or systems and then the validation of the recorder data.
However, in industrial fields as the automotive industry,
duplicating sensors correspond to a loss of profit and so solu-
tions permitting the verification of the sensors confidence
without any supplementary sensors have to be developed.
A large number of fault detectors have been developed
during the past decades, to deal with complex systems [4–14].
A large number of them are based on system model [15–
17] consisting in the comparison of the predicted behavior
of the system and the information generated by the sensors,
allowing to determine the system current state. This kind of
method needs a perfect knowledge and model of the system
behavior to work efficiently. In the studied case, the vehicle
manoeuvers could present strong nonlinearity whichwill add
complexity to the system modelling. Some solutions have
been proposed to deal with this problems [18–20] but in the
case of an automobile application strong and unpredictable
environmental interaction could be added to behavior non-
linearity, and model-based solutions will be less efficient.
Considering this context, a solution using analytical
redundancy seems a valuable alternative. Analytical redun-
dancy allows comparing the estimation of a chosen metric
from sensors of different types in order to detect and identify
deviant comportment [21]. Huang and Su have proposed
such a solution in [22] with the use of a set of extended
Kalman filters to compare the estimated state of an ego-
vehicle from different parallel filters, but this solution still
needs to determine a system model to work optimally.
Our proposed solution is based on analytical redundancy
using nonlinear transformations to generate residual signals
in order to detect sensors faults. The use of nonlinear
transformations allows improving detection robustness. The
paper will be shared in five parts: first, the presentation of
the architecture and some generalities are found in Section 2
and then the nonlinear transformation usedwill be studied in
Section 3 and finally the decision process will be discussed in
the fourth part. Some simulation results will be presented in
Section 5 and, finally, Section 6 will conclude this paper and
will provide some future works.
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Figure 1: Proposed FDI architecture.
2. Generalities and Architecture
2.1. Architecture. The proposed architecture (Figure 1) is
divided into two consecutive transformations which are
dedicated to the generation of the residual signal 𝑆󸀠. The first
transformation allows obtaining a common measurement
and the nonlinear transformation (TNL), giving the residual
quantity. The second transformation consists in the decision
process.The architecture can so be generalized for any type of
sensor, according to a measurement under test 𝑆, which has
to be estimated from every sensor.
The 𝐶 values correspond to the decision for each sensor,
taken into account in the global value estimation. 𝐶 = 1
means a sensor presents a faulty behavior (𝐶 = 0 corre-
sponding to a nominal behavior). The first necessary step to
apply this method is to define the measurements used and
apply the transformation to ensure the analytical redundancy.
If more than one measurement is chosen to complete the
fault detection, this architecture will be applied on every
measurement used in the fault detection, and a sensor will be
considered faulty if at least one of its corresponding decision
value is 1.
𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑠,1 ∙ 𝐶𝑠,2 ∙ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝐶𝑠,𝑀, (1)
where 𝐶𝑠,𝑚 represents the Boolean decision values for the
measurement m and the sensor 𝑠. It is so primordial to
define which measurements have to be tested according to
the monitored sensors. Measurements have to be generated
by at least three different sensors or sets of sensors and need
to ensure the faults observability. These two requirements
will be discussed in the two following sections for a specific
example.
2.2. Analytical Redundancy. In order to implement this
method, we need, in the first time, to determine the mea-
surements which will allow us to make the comparison in
order to study the tested sensor. In our case, we chose to
study proprioceptive sensors, usually used to predict an ego-
vehicle positioning state, to get inertial information from the
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Figure 2: Vehicle axes presentation.
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and to provide odometric
data needed to get vehicle speed (longitudinal or wheel
speed). Odometers permit us to measure each wheel speed
and distance travelled, when the INS will be used to measure
vehicle acceleration and yaw rates on the 3 axes (see Figure 2).
Using only this set of sensors, it is possible to determine
vehicle yaw rate and longitudinal acceleration, respectively,
named𝑉𝜃 and𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥. This information is directly given by the
INS sensor, when it has to be deduced from the odometric
speed and distance. Using each left-right pair of odometers
independently, it is possible to determine bothmeasurements
with the front and back couples of sensors. The longitudinal
acceleration is then given by the following when the yaw rate
is given by (5):
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝑉veh (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑉veh (𝑡) − 𝑉veh (𝑡 − 𝑇)𝑇 , (2)
where 𝑉veh is the vehicle speed determined with (3) with𝑉𝑂 𝐿 and𝑉𝑂 𝑅 being, respectively, the left and right odometric
speeds, and 𝑇 is a sampling period.
𝑉veh (𝑡) = 𝑉𝑂 𝑅 (𝑡) − 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡)2 . (3)
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Figure 3: Yaw rate determination.
Now using the odometric distances 𝐷𝑂 𝐿 and 𝐷𝑂 𝑅, it is
possible to approximate the yaw rate by calculating the
differential distance, 𝐷Diff , which can be approximate as the
difference between the right and left distances. In Figure 3,
R represents the distance between the two wheels, usually
known, depending on the vehicle characteristics.
It is then possible to determine the angle 𝜃 using (4) and
then the yaw rate (5).
𝜃 (𝑡) = 𝐷𝑂 𝑅 − 𝐷𝑂 𝐿𝑅 = 𝐷Diff (𝑡)𝑅 , (4)
𝑉𝜃𝑧 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝜃 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝜃 (𝑡)𝑇 . (5)
2.3. Observability. In order to be efficient, the transformation
stage has to ensure that fault on one sensor can still be noticed
on the transformed measurement. Basically, it consists in
verifying that the measurement during a faulty behavior 𝑆𝐹 is
different than the nominal behavior 𝑆NF. In order to analyze
the observability capability, we use faults models presented in
Qi et al. [23], which consider that sensors noises and errors
can be classified in four categories:
(i) An additive bias:
𝑦𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝑦NF (𝑡) + Δ. (6)
(ii) A scale factor:
𝑦𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑦NF (𝑡) . (7)
(iii) An aberrant error:
𝑦𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝑦NF (𝑡) + 𝑎𝛿 (𝑡 − 𝑡0) . (8)
(iv) A total loss, which corresponds to an output value of
the sensor stuck at 0 or registering only a stochastic
process.
Knowing these four faults levels and the transformation
applied on the sensors data, it is nowpossible to determine the
efficiency of the proposed architecture. Concerning the INS,
every type of fault is observable as there is no transformation,
but it has to be determined for the odometers.
First, a bias applied on only one odometric distance
(or speed) will be mostly masked by the estimation of the
acceleration. If the bias is a constant value, then it will gen-
erate no acceleration. However, during the appearance of the
fault, there will be a large instantaneous acceleration which
can be seen as a Dirac impulsion. The bias on odometric
speed will so generate an abnormal aberrant behavior on the
acceleration. It will also generate a bias on the yaw rate V𝜃z
(positive or negative depending on the affected odometer)
which is easier to detect. Here, the bias is applied on the right
odometer measurement. Knowing these four faults nature
and the transformation used, it is now possible to determine
the efficiency of the proposed architecture. Concerning the
INS, every kind of fault is observable as there is no trans-
formation, but it has to be determined for the odometers.
In the following equations, the nonfaulty measurements will
be noted as V𝜃zNF and AccxNF when the faulty measurements
will be V𝜃zF and AccxF, respectively, for the yaw rate and the
longitudinal acceleration. Our objective here is to extract the
nonfaulty value and observe the deviation introduced by the
injected fault.
𝑉𝜃𝑧𝐹 (𝑡) = (𝐷𝑂𝑅 + Δ) − 𝐷𝑂𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑇 = Δ𝑅 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑉𝜃𝑧NF (𝑡) . (9)
Now applying a scale factor to the right odometric speed,
the acceleration will be affected (10), but the resulting fault
appears as a gain and a bias which is depending on the
nonfaulty value from the other odometer. The yaw rate will
be affected in the same manner (11).
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥𝐹 (𝑡)
= (𝛼𝑉𝑂 𝑅 (𝑡) + 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡)) − (𝛼𝑉𝑂 𝑅 (𝑡 − 𝑇) + 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡 − 𝑇))2𝑇
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥𝐹 (𝑡)
= 𝛼𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥NF (𝑡) − (𝛼 − 1) (𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡) − 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡 − 𝑇))2𝑇
(10)
𝑉𝜃𝑧𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝛼𝑉𝜃𝑧NF (𝑡) + (𝛼 − 1)𝐷𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡)𝑅𝑇 (11)
A total loss, usually represented by the sensor’s output stuck
at 0, can be noticed on both acceleration (12) and yaw rate
(13).
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥𝐹 (𝑡) = (0 + 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡)) − (0 + 𝑉𝑂 𝐿 (𝑡 − 𝑇))2𝑇 ,
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑥NF (𝑡) − 𝑉𝑅 (𝑡) − 𝑉𝑅 (𝑡 − 𝑇)2𝑇 .
(12)
Here, the acceleration obtains an additive term correspond-
ing to the real acceleration of the affected wheel divided by
two (𝑉𝑅(𝑡) representing the real right wheel speed). The yaw
rate will also be affected by an additive term proportional
to the real distance travelled by the affected wheel, 𝐷𝑅, as
follows:
𝑉𝜃𝑧𝐹 (𝑡) = 0 − 𝐷𝑂 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑇 = 𝑉𝜃𝑧NF (𝑡) − 𝐷𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑇. (13)
An aberrant error will also lead to an aberrant error on
bothmeasurements, whichmeans highmeasurements values
during a brave time delay.
3. Nonlinear Transformation
Once the first transformation is done, it is possible to generate
the residual value 𝑆󸀠 using a nonlinear transformation. The
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Figure 4: Nonlinear transformation (TNL) example.
attributes of a residual value are generally as described in [24],
zero-centered during a nominal behavior, and presenting a
noncentered distribution with the appearance of a fault on
the corresponding measurement. In order to distinguish the
faulty source efficiently, the residual has to be insensitive
to fault appearance on other measurements. The chosen
transformation (Figure 4) consists in a nonsymmetrical
Gaussian transformation, centered on an estimation of the
measurement global value, 𝑆GV. The 𝜎 value permits the
adjustment of the sensitivity of the transformation.
𝑆󸀠 = 1 − [( 10.4 ∗ (2 ∗ 𝑝𝑖)0.5) ∗ exp−0.5∗((𝑆−𝑆GV)/𝜎)
2]
for 𝑆 ∈ [𝑆GV,∞[ ,
𝑆󸀠 = [( 10.4 ∗ (2 ∗ 𝑝𝑖)0.5) ∗ exp−0.5∗((𝑆−𝑆GV)/𝜎)
2] − 1
for 𝑆 ∈ ]−∞, 𝑆GV] .
(14)
In order to estimate the measurement global value, we need
to develop an estimationmethod, whichwill use all the inputs
measurements but has to be insensitive to fault. The chosen
method consists in a weighted mean value (15), where each
normalized weight𝑊𝑖 depends on the previous variation, as
described in (16) to (19). The 𝑆𝑖 value corresponds to the
measurement for the sensor 𝑖.
𝑆GV (𝑡) = 𝑁∑
𝑖=1
𝑊𝑖 (𝑡) ∗ 𝑆𝑖 (𝑡) , (15)
𝑊𝑖 = 𝑊𝑜𝑖 ∗ 1∑𝑁𝑗=1𝑊𝑜𝑗 , (16)
where 𝑁 is the total number of measurements. The normal-
ization is done to obtain a sum of weights equal to 1. The
original weight𝑊𝑜 is calculated using a parameter 𝑟 reflecting
the past and the current deviation between the connected
measurement and the estimated global value.
𝑊𝑜𝑖 = 1𝑟𝑖 , (17)
𝑟𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑔 ∗ [𝑟𝑖 (𝑡 − 1)] + (1 − 𝑔)
∗ [√(𝑆 (𝑡) − 𝑆GV (𝑡 − 1))2] , (18)
where 𝑔 is a coefficient allowing giving more importance to
the past values rather than the current deviation from the
global value. Replacing√(𝑆(𝑡) − 𝑆GV(𝑡 − 1))2 in the equation
by the term 𝜀, it is possible to generalize the calculation using
the initial deviation 𝑟init.
𝑟𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑔𝑁+1𝑟init + 𝑁∑
𝑖=0
[𝑔𝑖 (1 − 𝑔) ∗ 𝜀 (𝑡 − 𝑖)] . (19)
This estimation method will be evaluated and compared to
two others estimations in the simulation section.The residual
generation will also be evaluated in Section 5.
4. Decision Process
The decision process is done by comparison with a threshold
which has to be defined. Usually it is possible to optimally
determine the threshold value by using statistical tools [25,
26], knowing information about signals characteristics, a
priori probabilities, and so forth, but the currently studied
case does not allow knowing all the information needed.
Some alternative solutions such as the Neyman-Pearson
criterion have been developed to deal with only one part of
the information [27] but it still does not allow optimizing
decisions considering several faults natures.
Also the sensitivity of the nonlinear transformation will
need to be adjusted in order to optimize the detection. The
quality of detection is usually determined using the false
alarm and the missed detection rates, but other parameters
can be used to evaluate the test. For instance, the maximum
error during amissed detection or the cost depending on that
value and the probability of appearance can also be used as
quality criteria. In order to optimize the decision process, we
need in the first time to run simulations representing nominal
behavior. Then, failures have to be virtually added according
to the descriptionmade in Section 2.1.The simulation process
will be presented in the next section.
Using this database, the detection process will be done
(described in Figure 5), varying both sensitivity and threshold
in order to compare results for different cases (faults nature
and importance, sensor affected. . .). Then using quality cri-
teria, the parameters determination will be possible. The
developed method to optimize the decision process consists
in the choice of a first priority criterion. This criterion will
be adjusted by the user. Then every configuration allowing
encountering this criterion is determined and every other
configuration is removed.The second stage consists of choos-
ing a second criterion for which the optimal value will be
found and so the optimal parameters set can be defined.
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For example, it is possible to limit the false alarm rate
to 5% as a first priority constraint and optimize the missed
detection rate, and then we obtain the optimal parameter set
for the chosen constraints.Thismethod is so dependent of the
chosen strategy, and different cases will be presented during
the simulation section.
5. Simulations Tests,
Evaluation, and Validation
5.1. Transformations Stages. Simulations have been run in
two steps. First, vehicle and sensors nominal behaviors have
been simulated using industrial version of pro-SiVIC simu-
lation platform, allowing the generation of driving scenarios
on different tracks, with speed and direction variations, to get
feedback on the vehicle state taking into account its dynamic.
The research version of pro-SiVIC has already been used in
the development of different ADAS systems.
This software also models the sensors behavior. In order
to validate the proposed method, it is primordial to ensure
the failure detection function whatever the vehicle dynamic
is, so the proposed scenario will present a complex trajectory
with various dynamic cases, with speed changes both in
curves and straight lines and also constant speed periods; all
these driving conditions and dynamic states will allow having
results representative of a classic driving scenario involving
only one vehicle. Aswe focus on longitudinal acceleration and
yaw rate, both of them are represented in the Figure 6 for the
complete scenario.
As the method is working identically for both measure-
ments, we will focus in the first time on the acceleration.
First of all, we will evaluate the proposed global value esti-
mation.The results will be compared to two other estimation
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Figure 7: Nonfaulty global value estimation.
methods: a simple arithmeticalmean value calculation (called
method 1 in the results of Figure 7) and an estimation by
Kalman filtering (method 2). The proposed approach will be
referred to as method 3. First, the global value is directly
estimated from the three (INS and both front and back
odometers) measurements using the real acceleration as a
reference (Figure 7).
The three estimationmethods seem to work efficiently on
a nominal case of study.The next step is to virtually add faults
on measurements. Figure 8 represents estimations with one
of the three measurements directly affected by a bias (left), a
scale factor (center), and a punctual loss, represented by the
measurement blocked at the previous registered value (right).
The time interval affected by the default is highlighted in
orange.
The estimation is visibly affected by injected errors, but
this perturbation will depend on fault nature and value.
Table 1 is presenting the mean quadratic error value during
the exposure time for the three types of errors and for a set of
both bias and gain fault values.
Except for a small scale factor, the proposed method
(method 3) consisting in a weightedmean value calculation is
always equal to or better than the two others studied method.
Once the estimation method is validated, the nonlinear
transformation will be evaluated.
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Table 1: Mean quadratic error value for different fault characteristics depending on the estimation method.
Simulation parameters Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
No faults 3 ∗ 10−4 4 ∗ 10−4 4 ∗ 10−4
Bias, 0.1m/s2 on one measurement 1 ∗ 10−3 6 ∗ 10−4 6 ∗ 10−4
Bias, 0.3m/s2 1 ∗ 10−2 1 ∗ 10−3 8 ∗ 10−4
Bias, 0.5m/s2 3 ∗ 10−2 2 ∗ 10−3 1 ∗ 10−3
Scale factor, 0.9 0.9 ∗ 10−3 1.02 ∗ 10−3 1.02 ∗ 10−3
Scale factor, 0.7 2.4 ∗ 10−3 1.1 ∗ 10−3 1.05 ∗ 10−3
Scale factor, 0.5 5.2 ∗ 10−3 1.3 ∗ 10−3 1.2 ∗ 10−3
Stuck at the last recorded value 2 ∗ 10−2 1 ∗ 10−3 1 ∗ 10−3
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Figure 8: Impact of a fault on the global value estimation.
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Using pro-SiVIC data presented earlier, we compute in
the first time the nonlinear transformation on the three
measurements as described in Section 2, in a nominal
behavior, for two different 𝜎 values, 0.1 and 0.2. We are sup-
posed to observe zero-centered signal for each measurement
presenting a standard deviation depending on the noise level
and the configured sensitivity.
Results obtained represent perfectly the expected behav-
ior (Figure 9). The sigma value has to be set in order to make
the method more robust, keeping in mind that it has to be
small in order to detect the smallest fault values. All the faults
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Figure 10: TNL result with the injection of a bias.
models presented in Section 2 have been virtually added to
measurements in order to observe their impacts on the TNL
results and are presented in Figures 10–13. In all the figures,
the appearance of a fault is represented by an orange line and
the disappearance by a green line on the related sensor.When
a bias is added on the odometers, it is added on the speed
measurement and not directly on the acceleration estimation.
The aberrant error is simulated here by the addition of an
impulsion presenting an important value (at least ten times
the current measurement value) during one sampling period
when a total loss is simulated by a blocked value at zero.
Journal of Control Science and Engineering 7
0
32.521.510.50
−1
0
1
32.521.510.50
−0.5
−1
0
0.5
32.521.510.50
×10
4
×10
4
×10
4
TN
L 
fro
nt
 
od
om
et
er
s
TN
L 
ba
ck
 
od
om
et
er
s
TN
L 
IN
S
−1
1
0
Time ( ms)×10
Figure 11: TNL result with the injection of a scale factor.
−1
0
1
32.521.510.50
−1
0
1
32.521.510.50
−0.5
−1
0
0.5
32.521.510.50
×10
4
×10
4
×10
4
TN
L 
fro
nt
 
od
om
et
er
s
TN
L 
ba
ck
 
od
om
et
er
s
TN
L 
IN
S
Time ( ms)×10
Figure 12: TNL result with the injection of aberrant errors.
Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 present, respectively, results obtained
with the addition of bias, scale factor, aberrant error, and total
loss on measurements.
As expected for a bias or a scale factor on the odometric
measurement, the acceleration measurement shows a punc-
tual perturbation during the appearance (and disappearance)
event but a nonprominent one for the duration of the
disturbance.The yaw ratemeasurement will bemore effective
for this type of fault.
An aberrant error will generate a high intensity perturba-
tion on the nonlinear transformation.
These simulations allow visual validation of the impact
of each kind of fault on the nonlinear transformation, but
it is also possible to generalize the results, considering a
perturbation Δ𝑆 whatever the fault nature is, virtually added
to the measurement under test.
𝑆𝐹 (𝑡) = 𝑆NF (𝑡) + Δ𝑆, (20)
where 𝑆𝐹 and 𝑆NF are, respectively, the faulty and nonfaulty
measurements. Considering the same constant value as an
input for all the three measurements with the addition of
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Figure 13: TNL result with the injection of a total loss.
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Figure 14: Output sensitivity according to the input sensitivity and
the fault value.
noncorrelated stochastic processes on each of them in order
to simulate measure noises, we compute in the first time the
TNL, which will present the behavior observed in Figure 9.
Then, the exact same conditions are used with the addition of
a fault on one measurement. The simulation is repeated with
different sensitivities and fault values. Then, we compute for
each configuration the residual mean value 𝑆󸀠 and subtract
the nonfaulty mean value from the faulty one (𝑆󸀠𝐹 − 𝑆󸀠NF).
The resulting value can be seen as the transformation output
sensitivity to a fault according to the 𝜎 value. Figure 14
illustrates the obtained results according to fault and 𝜎 values.
As expected, the highest output sensitivity is observed for the
smallest 𝜎 values and the strongest faults.
Knowing that the proposed transformations are working
efficiently, the focus is now put on the decision process
optimization.
5.2. Decision Process. As depicted earlier, the decision is
made by comparison between the residual and a threshold.
The sensor is depicted as faulty if the absolute value of
the corresponding residual is higher than the threshold.
The sensor is still tested after the initial decision, but the
corresponding measurement will not be used in the global
value estimation as long as the residual is higher than the
8 Journal of Control Science and Engineering
G
oo
d 
de
te
ct
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
False alarm probability
G
oo
d 
de
te
ct
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
G
oo
d 
de
te
ct
io
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
False alarm probability False alarm probability
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 0 0
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1
Figure 15: ROC curves for a bias on INS acceleration measurement, 𝜎 at 0.02 (left), 0.4 (middle), and 0.8 (right).
Table 2: Colors meaning on the ROC curves.
Color Bias value (m/s2)
Blue 0.02
Green 0.2
Yellow 0.4
Black 0.6
Red 0.8
threshold. A recovery is still possible as the sensor remains
under test, and if its behavior leads its residual to decrease
below the threshold value, the decision value 𝐶 will return to
the initial state 0.
Following this strategy, in order to optimize the decision
process, it is required, in the first time, to run simulation
using previous results for faulty and nonfaulty measurements
and applying the decision, varying both TNL sensitivity and
threshold values to establish ROC curves.
ROC curves (Receiver Operating Characteristic) allow
evaluating hypothesis test quality by comparing good deci-
sions (𝑃𝐷) to false alarm (𝑃𝐹) rates [28]. An example of
representation is given in Figure 15 and Table 2 for a bias
on the INS acceleration measurement. The different colors
correspond to the injected fault value, to which will depend
the decision results. As the sensitivity has also an important
role to play in the decision process, the results are presented
for three different 𝜎 values.
The simulation is done for every kind of fault, varying
threshold, sensitivity, and fault values. In order to simplify,
the example of acceleration measurement for the INS sensor
is presented, but the proposed method can be easily applied
on every sensor and measurement. As the acceleration
measurement presents a large amount of values around 0,
scale factor and total loss represented by a stuck at zero
measurement will present a high missed detection rate, as
the faulty measurement will present values similar to the real
values. This kind of error does not present a high risk for the
system function, as perturbedmeasurements will be the same
as the real measurement value.
With the obtained information, the optimal parameter
can be determined.The decision process optimization objec-
tives are to determine the sensitivity and threshold values
allowing obtaining the best performances according to the
chosen criteria. As described in Section 4, a method has been
developed to choose these two parameters. As the false alarm
and missed detection (𝑃𝑀, 𝑃𝑀 = 1 − 𝑃𝐷) rates have been
determined for each parameters couple, and also themaximal
measurement error resulting from eachmissed detection, the
optimization process can be realized. It is possible in the first
time to choose characteristics allowing the lowest error rate,
but considering the current situation, it is more important
to limit the encountered maximum error due to a wrong
decision. So different strategies results can be compared to
evaluate the best solution.
First chosen strategy is as follows: 1st priority, false
alarm rate limited to 5%, 2nd priority, and maximum
error minimization.
In order to realize this optimization strategy, the deter-
mination of the maximum error is needed. So, for every
wrong decision, the error absolute value between the faulty
measurement and the realmeasurement has to be determined
(21); then the maximum error value is connected to each
configuration and then the optimization method can be
applied.
Er (𝑡) = √𝑆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑆real (𝑡). (21)
As the simulation is realized for every kind of fault, the error
will be determined for each fault nature. As only one set of
parameters has to be configured, the error corresponding to
each couple sensitivity/threshold can be assimilated as the
mean maximum error value.
ErG = ErBias + ErSFactor + ErTLoss3 . (22)
Using these two criterion, the results mentioned in Tables 3
and 4 are obtained, taking into account every nature of fault
with the same occurrence probability.
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Table 3: Obtained results for the first chosen strategy.
Maximum false alarm rate specified 0.05
Minimum error value in the remaining parameters set 0.0928
Threshold 0.47
Sensitivity 0.06
Corresponding false alarm rate 0.0496
Corresponding missed detection rate 0.551
Table 4: Obtained results for the second chosen strategy.
Maximum error accepted 0.05
Minimum false alarm rate in the remaining parameters set 0.169
Threshold 0.78
Sensitivity 0.02
Corresponding maximum observed error 0.0494
Corresponding missed detection rate 0.5121
The missed detection rate is high, as predicted, but the
maximal error encountered is lower than 0.1m/s2.
Second strategy is as follows: 1st priority, Maximum
acceptable error set at 0.05m/s2, 2nd priority, false
error rate minimization.
This second strategy takes into account the same parameters
but changing the priorities. In a system where we want the
smallest error possible between themeasurement and the real
value, this will probably be the best alternative.
Here the false alarm rate is higher (around 17%) mean-
ing sensors will frequently be isolated. In a system where
measurements can be analytically generated with the help of
other sensors, the temporary isolation does not present an
important inconvenience.This remains a strategical choice to
be made by the user, depending on wanted characteristics.
6. Conclusion
In order to deal with strong system nonlinearity and environ-
mental perturbations, a sensors fault detection algorithm has
been developed, using analytical redundancy and nonlinear
transformation. After the concept and architecture presen-
tation, the residual generation consisting of the comparison
of a common measurement nonlinear transformation (TNL)
has been depicted, duringwhich a global value estimation has
been proposed in order to remove themeasurement common
part. A strategy tomake the decision process optimization has
then been discussed.
The different part of the proposed algorithm has then
been evaluated through different simulations, using data
from pro-SiVIC software, allowing the simulation of a vehicle
dynamic behavior and the embedded sensor responses. In
the first time, the global value estimation has been com-
pared to two other estimation methods and shows better
results than them for almost all the configuration tested.
Then the behavior of the nonlinear transformation has been
studied, according to different fault nature and sensitivity
configuration. Then, as this parameter and the threshold
value have to be determined in order to ensure a quality
decision, the proposed method for the parameter choices has
been evaluated. In this last part, two different strategies have
been compared, according to the user preferences, allowing
limiting or reducing test results characteristics.
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